The Washington Post News Articles
A Plan In
Need of Clarity
December 4, 2009
Also Available on the Washington Post Website
I have great regard for the careful process the Obama administration
employed in its efforts to define a new approach for the
long-standing military commitment in Afghanistan and to put an
operational framework in place for our responsible withdrawal. I
intend, nevertheless, to continue to call on the administration to
clarify to the American public and Congress how it defines success
and how we reach an end point.
Since early 2009, I have said repeatedly that the U.S. strategy for
Afghanistan must proceed based on four considerations: (1) the
fragility of the Afghan government; (2) whether building a national
army of considerable scale is achievable; (3) whether an increased
U.S. military presence will ultimately have a positive effect in the
country, or whether we will be seen as an occupying force; and (4)
the linkage of events in Afghanistan and Pakistan. In the coming
weeks I intend to examine the administration's plan to see how it
addresses these criteria and how it will affect our troops.
Since the president's address Tuesday, there has been much
discussion of the date that the United States will begin to draw
down military forces and transfer security responsibility. Just as
important is a focus on creating the conditions to enable this
transfer of responsibility. The administration has not defined them
with sufficient clarity. Our strategy is sound only if framed with
clearly defined and attainable goals, an understandable end point
and a regional perspective. We must also avoid the inherent risks of
allowing our success in Afghanistan to be defined by events that are
largely beyond our control.
When U.S. troops entered Afghanistan in 2001, no true central
government had existed in that country since 1979. The agreements
reached in Bonn, Germany, in December 2001 led to a new
constitution, an interim government and the national election of
2004. The agreements also gave considerable power to a central
government in a country that is very disparate and historically far
removed from the concept of central governance. The result today is
a weak, fragile government in Kabul whose power on paper is far
greater than in reality. It is plagued by a lack of capacity and
rampant corruption. Many observers say that power needs to be
devolved to a more decentralized form of governance consistent with
tribal realities to achieve the Afghan government's long-term
viability.
We are ramping up deployment to about 100,000 troops, along with
tens of thousands of American contractors and civilians, to
implement a counterinsurgency strategy in Afghanistan. This greatly
enlarged presence runs the risk, well rooted in Afghanistan's
history of resisting foreign influence, that the United States will
be perceived as an occupying force instead of a presence seeking to
assist Afghans in improving their stability and development.
Another key question that remains to be answered is: How do we
define our enemy in Afghanistan? When we talk about the Taliban, we
interchange terms that aren't particularly interchangeable. Three
different types of actors are associated with the Taliban. First
came those in a vicious government that the United States assisted
in removing. Second, there is an ideologically charged group that
operates principally in Pakistan, associated with the forces of
international terrorism. Third, we have a separate group, presumably
growing with the greatest speed, that is viewed by many Afghans as
something of a regional militia defending local interests and that
doesn't particularly want to threaten U.S. interests outside
Afghanistan.
I have said consistently that countering international terrorism
requires highly maneuverable forces able to strike an intrinsically
mobile enemy. The departure of al-Qaeda from Iraq and, in large
measure, from Afghanistan demonstrates why more maneuverable U.S.
forces are to be favored against mobile international terrorist
movements. In each instance, al-Qaeda relocated to other areas,
including Pakistan and the Horn of Africa. Our military must retain
the same maneuverability.
On the personnel front, our active-duty military has been deployed
repeatedly for combat operations since 2001. Guard and reserve
components also have deployed at levels not envisioned when the
all-volunteer force was introduced. We are in uncharted territory in
terms of the long-term effects these deployments are having on the
well-being of our men and women in uniform, especially the Army and
Marine Corps. I introduced dwell-time legislation nearly three years
ago to ensure that we achieved a better balance in deployment cycles
with a minimum interval before follow-on deployments. The new
commitment of some 30,000 U.S. troops will put additional strains on
our forces and their families. I plan to press the administration on
this point to ensure that we are more vigilant in safeguarding the
welfare of our men and women in uniform.
The writer, a Democrat from Virginia who was secretary of the Navy in the Reagan administration, serves on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the Senate Armed Services Committee, where he is chairman of the subcommittee on personnel.
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